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Timing Rules and Legal Institutions 
 
Jacob E. Gersen* and Eric A. Posner** 
Abstract. Constitutional and legislative restrictions on the timing of legislation and regulation are 
ubiquitous but these “timing rules” have received little attention in the legal literature. Yet the 
timing of a law can be just as important as its content. The timing of a law determines whether its 
benefits are created sooner or later, and how the costs and benefits are spread across time, and 
hence to the advantage and disadvantage of different private groups, citizens, and elected officials. 
We argue that timing rules are, and should be, used to reduce agency problems within the 
legislature and between the legislature and the public, and to mitigate deliberative pathologies. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Most fights about new legislation focus on the legislation’s substance. Yet 
legislators regularly decide not just what to do, but when to do it, and often decisions 
about the timing of new law are just as critical as decisions about the content of new law. 
If a main goal of institutional design is to guard against undesirable legislative activity, 
regulating the timing of legislative choice might be more effective than directly 
regulating the content of legislation, or so we shall argue below. 
In the United States Congress and many other legislatures, choice about timing is 
heavily regulated by what we term timing rules, which have been largely ignored in the 
legal literature,1 and understudied in economics2 and political science.3 This is 
unfortunate because a panoply of constitutional, statutory, and internal congressional 
rules constrain the timing of legislative action, and “the mere timing of a vote can mean 
                                                 
1 The closest work in the legal literature is on the related but distinct topics of entrenchment and 
retroactivity. See, Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and 
Retroactivity, 1987 AM. BAR F. RES. J. 379 (1987). See also John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, 
Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385 (2003); Eric A. 
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L. J. 1665 (2002); 
Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L. J. 491 (1997). 
Prominent recent treatments of retroactivity include DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY (Chicago 2000); Louis 
Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. 
& Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 
(1991); Michael Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1985); Michael Graetz, Legal 
Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977). 
2 The relevant economics literature on timing generally focuses on options theory. For an introduction, see 
AVINASH DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY (Princeton 1994); Glenn R. 
Hubbard, Investment Under Uncertainty: Keeping One’s Options Open, 32 J. ECON. LIT. 1816 (1994) 
(book review). For early foundations, see Andrew B. Abel, Optimal Investment Under Uncertainty, 73 
AMER. ECON. REV. 228 (1983); Claude Henry, Investment Decisions Under Uncertainty: The Irreversibility 
Effect, 64 AMER. ECON. REV. 1006 (1974). For applications outside of investment theory, see W. Michael 
Hanemann, Information and the Concept of Option Value, 16 J. ENVIRON. ECON. MGT. 23 (1989); Robert 
McDonald, & Daniel R. Siegel, The Value of Waiting to Invest, 101 Q. J. ECON. 707 (1986). For more 
recent developments, see Andrew B. Abel, Avinash K. Dixit, Janice C. Eberly, & Robert S. Pindyk, 
Options, the Value of Capital, and Investment, 111 Q. J. ECON. 753 (1996). As applied to the legislature, 
see Fracesco Parisi, Vincy Fon, & Neta Ghei, The Value of Waiting in Lawmaking, 18 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 
131 (2004). 
3 A handful of political scientists have worked on issues that implicate timing, but few have focused 
explicitly on timing issues. See, e.g., PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME (Princeton 2004); Janet M. Box-
Steffensmeier, Laura W. Arnold, & Christopher J.W. Zorn, The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in 
Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 324 (1997); Alan 
M. Jacobs, Backing into the Future: Reconceiving Policy Reform as Intertemporal Choice (unpublished 
manuscript on file with the authors, 2007); Amihai Glazer, et al., Strategic Vote Delay in the U. S. House of 
Representatives, 20 LEGISLATIVE STUD. Q. 37 (1995). There is also a literature on bureaucratic delay; see, 
e.g., Amy Whritenour Ando, Waiting to Be Protected Under the Endangered Species Act: The Political 
Economy of Regulatory Delay, 42 J. LAW & ECON. 29 (1999); Lea-Rachel D. Kosnik, Sources of 
Bureaucratic Delay: A Case Study of FERC Dam Relicensing, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 258 (2006); Hilary 
Sigman, The Pace of Progress at Superfund Sites: Policy Goals and Interest Group Influence, 44 J. L. & 
ECON. 315 (2001). 
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nearly everything.”4 Some timing rules speed up legislative decision making, while 
others slow it down. Some timing rules delay implementation of new law; others dictate 
complete and immediate implementation. In this Article, we develop a theory of timing 
rules, exploring both the optimal timing of legislative action, and the implications for 
attempts to constrain it.  
Understanding the dynamics of legislative timing sheds light on the structure of 
rules that constrain legal institutions. We do not claim that timing rules are necessarily 
the result of intentional efforts to implement law in an optimal fashion, nor do we suggest 
that our framework completely describes the set of empirical timing rules observed in 
practice. Rather, our goal is to show how timing rules can drive policy, and to use actual 
timing rules in legislatures to motivate a theoretical discussion of the optimal timing of 
legislation. Timing rules can have both desirable and unfortunate effects on new law. 
Different sorts of timing rules can be understood as efforts to calibrate the timing of 
legislative consideration, enactment, and implementation of new law. For example, our 
theory suggests that timing rules should impose delay in decision-making scenarios 
where the incentives of political actors to hurry deviate (for one of a number of possible 
reasons that we specify below) from the underlying optimum.  
This Article analyzes the effect of timing rules on the nature of new laws. As 
such, our work grows out of a tradition in political science and economics that analyzes 
the effects of procedural rules on substantive legislative outcomes,5 and more recent 
scholarship in law that seeks to explore the foundation of constitutional rules of 
procedure.6 Although timing rules may interact with other procedural rules in important 
ways,7 the issues that timing rules raise are distinct and sufficiently important to warrant 
an independent inquiry.  
We propose that timing rules should be analyzed in the context of the principal-
agent problems that dominate political institutions—where an agent has the authority to 
act on behalf of, and for the benefit of, a principal but might not do so because the agent’s 
                                                 
4 Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, Separation of Powers, 
and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345, 349 (2003). 
5 See, e.g., Gary W. Cox, On the Effects of Legislative Rules, in LEGISLATURES: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES ON REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES 347 (Gerhard Loewenberg, Peverill Squire, & D. 
Roderick Kiewiet, eds. 2002); Keith Krehbiel, Restrictive Rules Reconsidered, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 929 
(1997); Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a 
Heterogenous Committee, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 459 (1988); Arthur T. Denzau & Robert J. Mackay, 
Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior, 27 
AM J. POL. SCI. 741 (1983); Arthur T. Denzau & Robert J. Mackay, Structure-induced Equilibria and 
Perfect-Foresight Expectations, 25 AM. J. POL. SCI. 762 (1981); Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, The 
Elusive Median Voter, 12 J. PUB. ECON. 143 (1979); Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Political 
Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo, 33 PUB. CHOICE 27 (1978).  
6 Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361 (2004); 
Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better than One?, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 145 
(1992); Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399 (2001); John 
O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A 
Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 488 (1995).  
7 See infra, Part III.A. 
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and the principal’s goals are different. Agency problems dominate relationships between 
voters and legislators, Congress as a whole and committee members, and legislators and 
the bureaucracy. Timing rules can be understood as a partial response to these agency 
problems: timing rules facilitate monitoring of agents by principals and reduce the ability 
of ill-motivated agents to make policy decisions that violate the preferences of political 
principals. Much of our work then suggests an optimistic story about timing rules. For 
example, within the legislature, timing rules may ensure that committees develop relevant 
expertise, but also guard against excessive bias in legislation. Outside the legislature, 
timing rules can allow a diffuse and disorganized public to combat the influence of 
private interest groups on legislation and more carefully monitor legislative behavior. 
However, timing rules have a dark side as well. Many timing rules create new agency 
problems, generating risk of undesirable behavior by political actors in future periods. 
And because many timing rules are chosen by legislators themselves, if legislators are ill-
motivated, then there is no reason to believe timing rules will always serve the good. We 
analyze these negative effects of timing rules as well.  
Our thesis then is part positive and part normative. Many of the timing rules we 
identify can be given a plausible rationale within our framework. However, there are also 
examples of timing mismatch, where the benefits of delay or rapidity demanded by the 
timing rule fit poorly with what our theory suggests about the optimal timing of 
legislation. Rather than claiming that we can accurately explain why timing rules are 
adopted in fact, we offer a partial rational reconstruction of timing rules, emphasizing the 
range of effects that timing rules have on politics and legislation. Because these effects 
can be either desirable or undesirable in different contexts, our framework is part 
normative as well. Although we do not attempt to identify the one right structure of 
timing rules, we do identify a series of relevant variables that point towards more delay or 
rapidity in lawmaking. We also suggest reasons to prefer regulating legislative behavior 
using timing rules rather than using content-based restrictions, and to rely more robustly 
on timing rules as mechanisms for improving public policy.  
Lest the discussion get too abstract too quickly, to motivate our discussion Part I 
begins by assembling a typology of timing rules that constrain the legislature. Part II 
develops a theory of the optimal timing of legislation and explains how the theory helps 
elucidate the choice of timing rules that constrain the legislature. Part III considers 
extensions of our theory, exploring the interaction of timing rules with other procedural 
rules, the enforcement of timing rules, the dynamics of timing rules in the retroactivity 
debate, and delegation to the bureaucracy.  
I. EXAMPLES 
Timing rules are specified in the Constitution, statutes, the formal rules of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, and the informal norms that constrain legislative 
action. The assortment of timing rules in these contexts is diverse, ranging from 
seemingly unimportant restrictions on the frequency or occasion for Congressional 
meetings, to rules that systematically build delay into the legislative process or force 
rapid legislative action. Our discussion here provides a sample, rather than the universe, 
of timing rules; it is intended to motivate the analysis rather than describe a complete set 
of rules to be explained. 
 Timing Rules and Legal Institutions 
 4 
Timing rules might initially be categorized into four types: Delay Rules, Rapidity 
Rules or Deadline Rules, Coordination Rules, and Trigger Rules. Delay Rules forestall 
action with the use of direct delay mechanisms. Deadline Rules mandate some action 
within a specified time period. Coordination Rules specify when an action is to take 
place, where the specific timing is arbitrary but a decisionmaking body would have 
difficulty coordinating on its own, for example, a rule of this sort might specify the date 
for the first meeting of Congress. Lastly, Trigger Rules use the timing of legislative 
action to trigger some other feature of the legislative process. We focus on delay rules 
and rapidity rules, but discuss other variants where relevant. 
At this point, we should also specify some rough contours of our inquiry. Any 
procedural rule can have the effect of generating delay.8 The presentment requirement, 
for example, though not a de jure timing rule, will lead to delay, because the President 
can rarely sign a bill immediately after its passage. Although we wish to distinguish de 
jure timing rules from de facto timing rules, we are skeptical that a hard theoretical line 
between the two can be maintained. There is a risk that defining timing rules broadly will 
cover virtually all procedural rules, but nonetheless we attempt to draw on both 
categories throughout. We also consider the interaction of formal timing rules with other 
institutional characteristics—some of which are procedural rules.  
A. Constitutional Timing Rules  
Many Constitutional Timing Rules are part of a more general class of 
Constitutional rules constraining congressional procedure.9 The Constitution contains a 
medley of rules that regulate timing explicitly. First, some clauses of the Constitution 
specify a deadline by which some action must be taken. Article I, section 2, clause 3 is a 
deadline rule, specifying a deadline by which the first census shall be conducted and the 
interval at which a new census shall be conducted: “The actual Enumeration shall be 
made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and 
within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law 
direct.”10 
Article I, section 8, clause 12 might be understood as a trigger rule. By mandating 
that “no Appropriation of Money to that Use [to raise and support armies] shall be for a 
longer Term than two Years,”11 the military appropriations clause necessitates a repeated 
                                                 
8 Although timing rules can increase the costs of enacting legislation, we generally focus on the effect of 
timing rules on the legislative process rather than the effect of any rule that increases the costs of enacting 
legislation. Timing rules may increase enactment costs and can sometimes be analyzed as a subset of the 
class of costly procedural rules. Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Judicial Doctrine, 
Legislative Enactment Costs, and the “Efficient Breach” of Constitutional Rights (unpublished manuscript 
2007); Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of Hard Look Review, 58 ADMIN L. REV. 753, 
794-800 (2006); Matthew C. Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise, 
23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 469, 490-91 (2007).  
9 See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
361 (2004).  
10 U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 2, cl. 3. 
11 U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 12.  
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declaration by the legislature that the appropriation is necessary. By requiring recurrent 
action to continue a policy, the clause might enhance public deliberation about, and 
monitoring of, legislative policymaking.  
Other constitutional rules mix triggers and deadlines. Article I, section 7, clause 2 
mandates that “If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days 
(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in 
like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its 
Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.”12 By specifying that after ten days, a bill 
passed by both houses of Congress and not yet signed by the President becomes law, the 
clause provides a hammer to force Presidential action. Setting aside the pocket veto, 
Presidential inaction cannot prevent a duly enacted bill from becoming law.  
Article I, section 2, clause 1 might be understood as both a coordination rule, a 
deadline rule, and a trigger rule. The clause requires that “The House of Representatives 
shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several 
States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors 
of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”13 The clause coordinates the 
selection of Representatives, triggers public evaluation of legislative performance via 
elections, and requires that elections be held by the end of the two year term. The twenty-
fifth amendment provides a detailed timeline for Presidential succession, and serves both 
coordination and trigger interests.14 
Another set of constitutional timing rules specifies the time at which future events 
will occur in order to avoid the impossibility of a subsequent legislative body specifying 
the time of its own meeting (a subset of coordination rules).15 For example, “[t]he 
Congress shall assemble at least once every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first 
Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different day.”16 The 
Constitution also requires that the Executive “shall from time to time give to the 
Congress information on the state of the union,”17 but does not specify the exact timing it 
is to occur. By modern norm the speech is delivered on the last Tuesday in January, but 
the date is not set by law. Some of these rules simply bootstrap the commencement of 
political institutions, and though they raise some interesting issues of their own, they are 
not the focus of our analysis. Rather, our focus is on timing rules that restrict the 
discretion of future political institutions, either generating delay in the legislative process 
or increasing the pace of legislative action.  
                                                 
12 U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 7, cl. 2. 
13 U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 2, cl. 1. 
14 U.S. Const. Amend. XXV, sec. 4. 
15 Vermeule, supra note 9; Jon Elster, Constitutional Bootstrapping in Paris and Philadelphia, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 549 (1993). 
16 U.S. Const., Art. I, sec 4, cl. 2. The clause was subsequently amended by U.S. Const. Amend. XX, § 2 
(changing meeting date to January 3).  
17 U.S. Const. Art. II, sec. 3, cl. 1.  
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The requirements that a bill pass both houses of Congress (bicameralism) and be 
presented to the President (presentment) impose delay, as noted above.18 So too, the 
Origination Clause which requires that all bills for raising revenue originate in the 
House,19 at least when measured against a baseline of both houses having proposal 
power. These are de facto timing rules. Other constitutional timing rules are absent from 
the federal constitution, but present in other constitutions. For example, many state 
constitutions regulate the time during which new legislation may be proposed, precluding 
the introduction of new bills within a certain number of days of the end of the legislative 
session.20 Others require that two separate votes in two successive legislative sessions be 
taken in order to amend the constitution.21 These constitutional timing rules are just 
illustrations, but they illustrate the diversity of timing rules in constitutions.  
B. Statutory Timing Rules 
Statutes are another rich source of timing rules.22 For example, the Bipartisan 
Trade Promotion Authority Act requires Congress to schedule a vote on covered trade 
agreements with foreign governments within two months, while also prohibiting 
amendments.23 “Fast-track” is a rapidity rule, the opposite of a delay rule.  
The timetable for legislative action on the federal budget is also specified by 
statute.24 The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 sets out a detailed 
timetable for the budget process requiring the President to submit his proposed budget 
fifteen days after Congress meets, Congress to complete action on bills and resolutions 
providing new budget and spending authority by September 15, and Congress to take 
final action on reconciliation bills or resolution or both by September 25.25 Although the 
timeline provides coordination benefits, the statute is also intended to increase and 
routinize the pace of the budget process.  
The National Emergencies Act authorizes the President to declare a national 
emergency. However, it also requires that “each House of Congress shall meet to 
consider a vote on a concurrent resolution to determine whether that emergency shall be 
                                                 
18 U.S. Const., Art I. sec. 7.  
19 U.S. Const., Art I. sec. 7, cl. 1 (“All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of 
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills.”). 
20 See Vermeule, supra note 9. 
21 See, e.g., Mass. Const. amend LXXXI. For a survey of amendment procedures in U.S. state constitutions 
see ROBERT L. MADDEX, STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (2D 2006).  
22 On statutory control of subsequent lawmaking process, see generally Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of 
Framework Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717 (2005); Charles Tiefer, How to Steal a Trillion: 
The Uses of Laws about Lawmaking in 2001, 17 J.L. & POL. 409 (2001); Bruhl, supra note 4. 
23 19 U.S.C. § 2191. The statute specifies the Rules of the House of Representatives and the Senate, but 
does so “with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as 
relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the 
case of any other rule of that House.” 19 U.S.C. § 2191(a)(2).  
24 See 2 U.S.C. § 631.  
25 88 Stat. 297, 306 (1974).  
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terminated.”26 If a resolution is passed by one House, the statute requires that the 
resolution be immediately referred to the appropriate committee of the other House and 
be reported out of committee within 15 calendar days unless the House determines 
otherwise by yeas and nays.27 
Both the Budget Act and the National Emergencies Act provide timing rules in 
important policy domains, but other timing statues are more mundane.28 For example, the 
Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act of 1976 outlines elaborate procedures and timing 
rules to be followed by Congress once the President makes determinations on Alaskan 
natural gas pipelines.29 Similarly, the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 
1976 specifies procedural rules including timing rules for the disapproval of international 
fisheries agreements.30 Statutes of this sort have been variously referred to as “framework 
legislation”31 or “statutized rules,”32 but regardless of nomenclature, they often contain 
timing rules for enacting legislation. Indeed, many of these measures are explicitly 
“expedition” statutes, intended to speed up the process of congressional consideration.33  
An oddity in these statues is that they often contain a specific statement that each 
House maintains the constitutional authority to change its rules at any time. In fact, if this 
authority is constitutional than these statues need say nothing about the matter at all: 
either House might, at any time, alter its rules. It is an open question whether statutory 
restrictions on legislative rules could preclude subsequent alteration without a statutory 
amendment. We set this issue aside, noting only that our analysis remains valid so long as 
Congress treats statutory timing rules as binding. 
C. Internal Timing Rules 
Although the federal constitution regulates the timing of legislative action 
directly, its most important contribution to timing rules is the rules of proceedings 
clause,34 which allows each house to determine its own internal rules of procedure. The 
House of Representatives adopts new rules at the commencement of each session by 
majority vote; the Senate considers itself a continuing body and the Standing Rules 
continue in effect from session to session. Both the House Rules and the Senate Rules 
contain an extensive set of provisions on timing. Below we offer a few examples from 
each legislative body.  
1. Examples 
                                                 
26 90 Stat. 1255, 1256 § 202(b) (1976), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1622.  
27 50 U.S.C. § 1622(c)(3).  
28 See generally Bruhl, supra note 22, at 346 n. 9 (collecting statutes that specify congressional procedures).  
29 90 Stat. 2903 (1976), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 719f.  
30 16 U.S.C. § 1823; 90 Stat 340 (1994).  
31 Garrett, supra note 22.  
32 Bruhl, supra note 4. 
33 See generally Tiefer, supra note 22 at 410.  
34 U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings . . . .”).  
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Most timing rules in the Senate are contained in Rule XIV on “bills, joint 
resolutions, resolutions, and preambles thereto.” Rule XIV.1 specifies that “Whenever a 
bill or joint resolution shall be offered, its introduction shall, if objected to, be postponed 
for one day.”35 Rule XIV.2 is a three reading rule requiring that every bill and joint 
resolution receive three readings prior to passage, which any senator may request be on 
three different legislative days.36 Both parts 1 and 2 of Senate Rule XIV are essentially 
minority-protecting delay rules. While a minority of one cannot forestall the legislation 
forever, a lone Senator, by the terms of the rule, can trigger some delay in the legislative 
process.37 Another rule requires that “All reports of committees and motions to discharge 
a committee from the consideration of a subject, and all subjects from which a committee 
shall be discharged, shall lie over one day for consideration, unless by unanimous consent 
the Senate shall otherwise direct.”38 Equivalently, one Senator may require that all bills 
being discharged from committee be held for one day.  
Senate Rule XVII.3(a) allows for privileged consideration of a motion by the 
majority and minority leaders to refer a bill to multiple committees, but not until twenty-
four hours after the motion has been printed and made available to Senators in the 
Congressional Record.39 Senate Rule XVII.4(a) requires that all “reports of committees 
and motions to discharge a committee from the consideration of a subject . . . shall lie 
over one day for consideration, unless by unanimous consent the Senate shall otherwise 
direct.”40 Rule XXVI governs committee procedure. One provision of the rule allows any 
three members of a committee to request a special meeting of the committee. “If, within 
three calendar days after the filing of the request, the chairman does not call the requested 
special meeting, to be held within seven calendar days after the filing of the request, a 
majority of the members of the committee may file in the offices of the committee their 
written notice that a special meeting of the committee will be held, specifying the date 
and hour of that special meeting. The committee shall meet on that date and hour.”41 The 
Rule allows a minority of a committee to trigger a special meeting, after a specified time 
period has elapsed. The various Senate Rules sometimes require rapidity in the legislative 
process and sometimes impose delay.  
Although the Rules of the House of Representatives are adopted at the beginning 
of each Congress, in most sessions the House Rules also contain a good number of timing 
rules. Consider House Rule XVI governing Motions and Amendments, the parallel to the 
Senate’s three reading rule. House Rule XVI requires a full reading when the bill is first 
considered,42 a second reading when the bill is read for amendment in a committee of the 
                                                 
35 Senate Rule XIV.1. 
36 Senate Rule XIV.2. 
37 Senate Rule XIV.  
38 Senate Rule XVII.4(a).  
39 Senate Rule XVII.3(a).  
40 Senate Rule XVII.4(a). 
41 Senate Rule XXVI.3.  
42 House Rule XVI(a) (“A first reading is in full when the bill or joint resolution is first considered.”).  
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Whole House,43 and a third reading before a vote.44 Reading rules serve familiar goals of 
notice, but they are also de facto legislative delay rules. Multiple reading rules are timing 
rules that impose delay on the legislative process.  
House Rule XIII governs House calendars and committee reports. Rule XIII.2 
(b)(2) requires that “the report of a committee on a measure that has been approved by 
the committee shall be filed within seven calendar days . . . .”45 The rule establishes a 
deadline, essentially a rapidity rule. Other portions of the rule impose delay. Rule 
XIII.4(a)(1) specifies that “it shall not be in order to consider in the House a measure or 
matter reported by a committee until the third calendar day . . . on which each report of a 
committee on that measure or matter has been available to Members, Delegates, and the 
Resident Commissioner.”46 House Rule XV.1(a) restricts the timing of a motion to 
suspend the rules: “A rule may not be suspended except by a vote of two-thirds of the 
Members voting, a quorum being present. The Speaker may not entertain a motion that 
the House suspend the rules except on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays and during 
the last six days of a session of Congress.”47 Rule XV.2(a) specifies that discharge 
motions shall be in order on the second and fourth Mondays of a month. By doing so the 
rule imposes some delay in the legislative process, but also coordinates the timing of 
motions to discharge. Rule XV.2(b)(1)(B) could be understood as either a delay or 
rapidity rule. It allows a motion to discharge “a committee from consideration of a public 
bill or public resolution that has been referred to it for 30 legislative days.”48 Like the 
Senate Rules, the various timing rules of the House interact to inject delay and rapidity 
into the overall legislative process.  
2. The Puzzle of Waiver 
Unlike constitutional timing rules and arguably statutory timing rules, internal 
Congressional timing rules have a puzzling feature: the rules can be waived. For 
example, in the Senate, an internal rule can be changed by a supermajority vote,49 
suspended by majority vote with notice,50 or suspended by unanimous consent without 
                                                 
43 House Rule XVI(b) (“A second reading occurs only when the bill or joint resolution is read for 
amendment in a Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union under clause 5 of rule XVIII.”).  
44 House Rule XVI(c) (“A third reading precedes passage when the Speaker states the question: ‘‘Shall the 
bill [or joint resolution] be engrossed [when applicable] and read a third time?’’ If that question is decided 
in the affirmative, then the bill or joint resolution shall be read the final time by title and then the question 
shall be put on its passage.”).  
45 House Rule XIII.2(b)(2).  
46 House Rule XIII.4(a)(1).  
47 House Rule XV.1(a). 
48 House Rule XV.2(b)(1)(B).  
49 And arguably a bare majority, depending on one’s interpretation of the Senate Rules. Various procedural 
gambits are surveyed in the commentary on the filibuster. See generally GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC 
SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER: OBSTRUCTION & LAWMAKING IN THE U.S. SENATE (Princeton 2006).  
50 Senate Rule V.1 (“No motion to suspend, modify, or amend any rule, or any part thereof, shall be in 
order, except on one day’s notice in writing, specifying precisely the rule or part proposed to be suspended, 
modified, or amended, and the purpose thereof.”).  
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notice.51 If the rule can be waived, how seriously should timing rules be taken as a 
restriction on legislative behavior? If legislators always act optimally, then the timing 
rule constraint is unnecessary. Legislators would delay when delay is warranted and 
speed up when rapidity is warranted. If legislators are ill-motivated, they would not adopt 
timing rules in time 0 to constrain themselves in a desirable way at time 1. Presumably, 
the ill-motivated legislature would like to maximize its ability to do ill across time 
periods. Our account adds little to the literature on this front.52 
The waiver concern does not apply to constitutional rules, and there is an open 
question about whether statutory rules of procedure can be altered without a subsequent 
statute repealing or amending the prior statute. But many timing rules are internal rules, 
and the importance of our project would be reduced if timing rules had no binding effect 
on legislative behavior.  
The conventional wisdom is that internal rules are important and often 
constraining.53 This should be no more or less true for timing rules than other rules. In 
part, this is because waiver can be costly either because of reputation or because of voting 
rules. If members of a legislature believe that timing rules provide general benefits, 
legislators may refrain from waiving timing rules to facilitate enactment of a specific 
piece of legislation. If respect for the rules emerges as a historical norm, concern for a 
legislator’s reputation may make the rules binding in practice though waivable in theory. 
Waiving the Senate Rules formally requires either one day’s notice or unanimous 
consent.54 Either some additional delay is required, in which case the primary delay rule 
is only partially avoided, or unanimity is required, which may be difficult to assemble. 
The degree of constraint imposed by internal timing rules is a function of the cost of 
waiver, which is a function of voting rules.  
We assume that a rational legislature at time 0 might adopt some constraints on its 
behavior in time 1. Slowing down certain classes of decisions to avoid certain forms of 
political pressure is a stock justification for procedural hurdles in Congress and 
                                                 
51 Senate Rule V.1 (“Any rule may be suspended without notice by the unanimous consent of the Senate, 
except as otherwise provided by the rules.”).  
52 These questions are addressed by the literature on self-commitment. See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES 
UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000) 
53 Compare the debate surrounding the “nuclear option” controversy in which the Senate rules would be 
altered by simple majority vote to avoid filibusters of judicial nominations. See, e.g., David S. Law & 
Lawrence B. Solum, Positive Political Theory and the Law: Judicial Selection, Appointments Gridlock, and 
the Nuclear Option, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51(2006). Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, In 
Defense of Filibustering Judicial Nominations, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 331 (2005); Catherine Fisk & Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181 (1997); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, 
Supermajority Rules and the Judicial Confirmation Process, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 543 (2005). 
54 Senate Rule V.1 (“No motion to suspend, modify, or amend any rule, or any part thereof, shall be in 
order, except on one day's notice in writing, specifying precisely the rule or part proposed to be suspended, 
modified, or amended, and the purpose thereof. Any rule may be suspended without notice by the 
unanimous consent of the Senate, except as otherwise provided by the rules.”). 
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delegation to bureaucratic institutions.55 If legislatures use timing rules to structure 
deliberations, the effects of timing rules should be properly understood. This framing 
sidesteps the positive puzzle about waiver in a somewhat unsatisfying way, but not in a 
way that is unique to our work. 
 II. THEORY 
We now provide a framework for understanding timing rules. First, we explain 
the costs and benefits of delaying legislative action. Second, we explain the effects of 
timing rules on Congress’s incentives to delay or speed up legislative action. Third, we 
address what we call “internal” reasons for why Congress would want to constrain itself 
with timing rules—namely, to solve internal problems of cooperation among the 
members of Congress. Fourth, we address “external” reasons for timing rules as solutions 
to agency problems between Congress and the public. Although, for expository 
simplicity, we will focus on Congress, much of what we say applies to other government 
actors as well, as we will discuss in Part III.56 Our theoretical discussion can be applied to 
many, but not all, of the empirical instances of timing rules highlighted above. The match 
between the general theoretical concerns emphasized in Part II and illustrations used to 
motivate the discussion is reasonably strong, but also clearly imperfect.    
A. Optimal Timing in Light of Uncertainty 
Suppose that Congress believes that certain legislation would create a public good 
worth B at a cost of C, where B>C.57 The legislation could create the public good in 
period 1, period 2, or period 3. (Period 3 becomes relevant only when we address delay 
rules in Part B.) The cost is incurred at the same time as the benefit is created and the 
legislation lasts for one period.  As time passes, additional information about the potential 
effects of the legislation is revealed: in particular, at the start of period 2 it is revealed 
whether B>C.  Enacting a law incurs legislative costs, k, which might vary across periods, 
depending on how busy Congress is. Finally, we assume that if the creation of the public 
good is deferred, people may adjust their behavior during period 1. This may either 
reduce the costs C or equivalently increase the benefits B of the legislation. For 
                                                 
55 Roger G. Noll & James Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 747, 774–75 (1990); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and 
Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 593 (2002). The independent central bank is the 
classic example of insulation of government decisions from political pressure. As others have noted, 
political insulation of this sort may be entirely rational. See Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Time to 
Build and Aggregate Fluctuations, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1345 (1982); Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. 
Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POLIT. ECON. 473 (1977).  
56 One potential ambiguity in our analysis concerns the relationship between what might be called 
“legislative time” and “real-world time.” Many of the rules we identify impose significant delay within the 
legislature, but trivial delay outside the literature. For example, a rule requiring a delay of three legislative 
days imposes trivial delay in the real world. However, within the legislature where the legislative agenda is 
often overflowing, a delay of three legislative days may be extremely significant. We reference this 
distinction occasionally in our model and discussion. For the most part, the distinction is allowed to remain 
implicit.  
57 Although we emphasize public goods for purposes of discussion, there is nothing in our model that 
requires the legislation be for public goods rather than private goods.  
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simplicity, we focus on the cost side. To distinguish cases when people can and cannot 
adjust, we will refer to CH and CL, where CH>CL. If people can adjust, then the cost is 
only CL; if they cannot adjust, the cost is CH. 
Congress has a choice: it can pass the law in period 1, to go into effect the same 
period; or it can wait and pass the law in period 2, to go into effect in period 2.If 
Congress passes the law in period 1, then the benefit B will be created with probability p 
(while the cost, C, is certain); otherwise it will produce a benefit of (say) 0.  Thus, acting 
quickly creates a risk that a law will produce no benefit, but it allows the public to enjoy 
the benefit of the public good immediately if it turns out that the benefit is created. 
If Congress waits until period 2, then it will pass the law only if it turns out that 
B>C.  Thus, Congress avoids the risk that it will incur legislative costs, k, to enact a law 
that produces costs and no benefits.  Further, it enables regulated individuals to adjust, 
and so incur CL rather than CH.  The disadvantage of waiting is that the public benefit, if 
it is realized, occurs later rather than sooner. 
Note that a “period” is not meant to refer to a specific unit of time such as a year 
or a legislative session. The term is kept abstract and its meaning depends on the context 
to which the framework is applied. Such abstraction is necessitated also by the ambiguity 
of the effects of timing rules, which we will address below. Some rules effect delay of 
just a day or two, but given the demands on Congress’s time, the practical effect of such 
rules could be much greater. 
To fix intuitions, consider an example. The public good is cleaner air; the benefit 
consists of aesthetic and health benefits; the cost consists of the cost of installing 
scrubbers for smokestacks. Relevant meteorological conditions will not be determined 
until period 2. With probability 1-p, the scrubbers will do no good (because they turn out 
to eliminate particles that blow elsewhere and to have no effect on particles that remain 
within the area). If the public good is created in period 2, factory owners can adjust by 
installing scrubbers while smokestacks are already under construction or being repaired; 
if the public good is created in period 1, they cannot adjust in this way, but instead must 
take special steps to install the scrubbers. 
The two main alternatives are as follows. 
Immediate legislation. Congress enacts a law that creates the public good in 
period 1, to take effect in period 1. The benefit B is created with probability p, while the 
cost CH of creating the public good and the legislative costs, k, are certain. Thus, the 
value of the action is pB-CH-k. 
Deferred legislation. Congress waits and then passes the law in period 2 if and 
only if the public good has positive value of B. Now the benefit B and the cost CL (low 
cost because people have a chance to adjust, assuming they can anticipate deferred 
legislation) are incurred with probability p, as is the legislative cost. However, because of 
delay, the value of the action must be discounted by discount factor d, where d < 1. Thus, 
the value of deferred legislation is dp(B-CL-k). 
It is clear and intuitive that immediate legislation dominates deferred legislation 
when the probability that B will be created is high, the cost of creating the public good is 
low, adjustment costs are low, legislative enactment costs are low, and discounting is 
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great. In our example, Congress should pass immediate legislation if it is highly likely 
that the scrubbers will clean the air (so further study adds little information), it is only a 
little cheaper to install scrubbers earlier rather than later (because there is no construction 
or repair going on), the particular environmental legislation is simple and cheaply 
enacted, and people value present benefits greatly over future benefits.58 
Now consider a third and fourth alternative. 
Anticipatory legislation. Congress passes the law in period 1, to take effect in 
period 2.59 The legislative costs, k, are incurred with certainty and without discounting; 
the public good is discounted and probabilistic. Thus, the value of anticipatory legislation 
is d[pB-CL]-k. However, if B=0, Congress will repeal the statute at period 2 (if the costs 
of repeal are less than CL) rather than incur the loss of CL, so the actual value would be: 
d[p(B-CL)-(1-p)k]-k. 
Conditional legislation. Congress passes a law in period 1 that provides that the 
public good will be created in period 2 if and only if it has positive value of B. The value 
of this action is d[p(B-CL)]-k. The cost of repeal is avoided.60 
Against the baseline of deferred legislation, one advantage of anticipatory 
legislation is that the legislative costs are incurred at period 1 rather than period 2. 
Normally it would be better to put off legislative costs (if they are discounted), but 
Congress might anticipate that legislative costs will be higher in period 2—because it will 
be busier or because political conditions will change. If p is very high, then anticipatory 
legislation could also be optimal for legislators. Another advantage of anticipatory 
legislation, albeit not shown in our notation, is that adjustment costs should be lower 
because citizens can more confidently rely on the public good being created. If 
anticipatory legislation is used, the public good will be created unless Congress repeals 
the law in period 2. If deferred legislation is used, the public good is created only if 
Congress finally acts in period 2. Because legislative action is more difficult and costly 
than inaction, anticipatory legislation increases the probability that the public good will 
be created at the time that citizens adjust. The probability of the public good being 
created in time 2 is a relevant variable for anticipatory, conditional, and deferred 
legislation. In our model, it is irrelevant to immediate legislation because the costs and 
                                                 
58 To the extent that legislation creates irreversibilities, immediate legislation also sacrifices option value. 
See Parisi, et al., supra note 2. 
59 See, e.g., International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 4597 (1994), codified at 
15 U.S.C. §6210) (imposing reporting requirements on the Attorney General beginning three years after the 
date of enactment); Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, 118 Stat. 2341, 2369 (2004) 
(deferring implementation of Act for six months); Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act 
of 2004, codified at 20 U.S.C. 1408(b) (imposing enhanced reporting requirements on the Secretary of 
Education two years after enactment); 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(3)(C) (Clean Air Act) (deferring applicability of 
regulations to a time no earlier than the model year commencing four years after such revised standard is 
promulgated).  
60 See e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Amendments of 1988, 102 Stat. 2654, 
2672-73 (1988), codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136q(f) (stripping sates of authority to exercise enforcement 
responsibility pursuant to Act after five years unless the Administrator determines that state is adequately 
complying with other provisions of the statute).  
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benefits are realized entirely in period 1. If legislation distributed costs and benefits 
across time periods, the probability of repeal would be relevant to immediate legislation 
as well.  
Generally, Congress would prefer conditional legislation to anticipatory 
legislation, as the former avoids the cost, CL, in period 2, with probability 1-p. The main 
problem with conditional legislation is that some decisionmaker—a judge, an agency, the 
President—must determine whether the conditions are met in period 2, and the 
decisionmaker might act dishonestly or opportunistically or simply erroneously. And if 
citizens expect that the decisionmaker will make the wrong decision in period 2, they will 
not adjust properly in period 1. 
Going back to our example, Congress might pass an anticipatory law in period 1 
that provides for the installation of the scrubbers in period 2. A conditional law passed in 
period 1 would provide that a decisionmaker—say, the Environmental Protection 
Agency—will order the installation of the scrubbers in period 2 if it finds that that the 
meteorological conditions so warrant. As noted, anticipatory legislation would encourage 
regulated parties to adjust, but can result in bad law in period 2—or else requires 
Congress to act a second time and repeal the law. The conditional law avoids this 
outcome but at the risk of a bad or costly decision by the EPA. 
Although the ideal types of legislation—immediate, anticipatory, deferred, and 
conditional—can be well-specified in theory, in any given case it may be unclear how to 
categorize a particular statute. Consider the Patriot Act.61 Many of its provisions gave law 
enforcement agencies powers that they had long believed necessary. On this backward-
looking view, the Patriot Act was deferred legislation. But some of its provisions were, 
according to its critics, unnecessary given the uncertain level of threat post-9/11, though 
they could conceivably be necessary if the level of threat turned out to be high enough. 
On this view, those provisions of the Patriot Act were immediate legislation. 
This ambiguity notwithstanding, the four types of legislation can be readily 
identified in the political landscape. Anticipatory legislation is common: many enacted 
statutes delay implementation until some specified future date—usually the start of the 
new calendar year. Other statutes phase in or phase out benefits or costs over several time 
periods. That Congress is uncertain that the anticipatory legislation will actually create 
the public good is revealed by the telltale sunset clause, which provides for the automatic 
repeal of the statute, suggesting that Congress is not sure that the legislation will be 
beneficial.62 Deferred legislation is also common. Waiting for future study is the norm in 
                                                 
61 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).  
62 This practice has an early genesis in the United States. In the First Congress, one debate centered on 
whether the Impost Act should contain a sunset provision, with Madison’s proposal to include a sunset 
ultimately winning. At least one representative, Thomas Tudor Tucker of South Carolina, thought that 
virtually all statutes should contain sunsets. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 519, 541 (2003) (quoting Tucker on his view that nothing could justify a perpetual law except 
“circumstances which would render a law equally necessary now, and on all future occasions”). Early 
bankruptcy statutes were similar. See Statute of 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30 (1732) (incorporating the Statute of 4 Anne, 
ch 17). See also Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. 
BANKR. L. J. 325, 333 n. 47 (1991); Jay Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and Its Relation to 
the Development of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL HIST. 153, 156 (1982) (explaining that the 1705 
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legislative decisionmaking. Immediate legislation occurs most often during crises and 
emergencies. Conditional legislation is common but typically takes the form of legislative 
delegations to the executive branch.63 A statute says that if certain conditions are met, 
then the President may or must take certain actions.64 
We have ignored numerous complications, one of the most important being 
statutes that create costs and benefits in different periods. For example, appropriating 
funds for the construction of a bridge incurs costs in period 1, when the tax bite is felt, for 
benefits in period 2, when the bridge is finished and can be used. Conversely, incurring 
debt in order to lower taxes creates a benefit for period 1, when taxpayers have more 
funds at their disposal, and a cost for period 2, when the debt must be repaid with interest. 
Costs and benefits can also be spread out in more complex ways across periods. It is 
important to keep these complications in mind, but we will ignore them in order to keep 
the analysis simple and because they do not detract from our main arguments. 
Another complication we have ignored is the importance of partisan differences in 
determining when legislation is enacted. From the public’s view, it might be optimal for a 
particular law to be enacted soon, and everyone might agree with this. Nonetheless, the 
minority in a legislature might hope to delay enactment until after the next election, 
which could result in the minority party becoming the majority party—or other 
advantages such as a new president who belongs to the minority party. If delay can be 
achieved, the law might be passed after an amendment that favors the minority party in 
some way. Another advantage of delay is that delay could deprive the majority party of a 
legislative success that would improve its chances at the election—unless, of course, the 
majority party can successfully blame the minority party for delay. All in all, it is a 
striking feature of the delay rules that they favor the minority group by giving them tools 
for pushing legislation off into a potentially sunnier political future. But in this way, 
delay rules are quite similar to supermajority rules, which have the same effect, and are 
extensively analyzed elsewhere.65 
                                                                                                                                                 
Act, “like much legislation of the time, contained a ‘sunset’ provision”). Sunsets, of course, might be used 
for reasons other than uncertainty about benefits as well. See Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 
U. CHI. L. REV. 247 (2007).  
63 See, e.g., section 11 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, which requires the Federal 
Communications Commission to review all of its regulations applicable to providers of telecommunications 
services in every even-numbered year, beginning in 1998, to determine whether the regulations are no 
longer in the public interest due to meaningful economic competition between providers of the service, and 
whether such regulations should be repealed or modified. 47 U.S.C § 161 (2000). That is, the FCC is to 
regulate, conditional on the existence of inadequate competition in the telecommunications industry.  
64 See, e.g., the various conditional laws discussed in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 691-92 
(1892). The Act of June 4, 1794 gave the President the authority to lay an embargo on all ships and vessels 
in the ports of the United States “whenever, in his opinion, the public safety shall so require.” 1 Stat. 372 
1794). The Act of March 6, 1866 gave the President authority to declare a prior statute inoperative 
“whenever in his judgement [the importation of neat cattle and the hides of neat cattle] may be made 
without danger of the introduction of spread of contagious or infectious disease among the cattle of the 
United States.” 14 Stat. 4 (1866). 
65 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Majority and Supermajority Rules: Three Views of 
the Capitol, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1115 (2007); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules 
as a Constitutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365 (1999); Timothy Groseclose & James M. 
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So far we have suggested that Congress has good reasons for choosing one of the 
four temporal types of legislation. Timing allows Congress to economize on legislative 
costs, address problems quickly or enable citizens to adjust, and handle uncertainty about 
the effects of a legislative proposal.66 But if Congress has the right incentives to time 
legislation, it would not need to be regulated by the rules described in Part I. Thus, we 
now turn to the question of why Congress might time legislation poorly, and whether 
these rules provide Congress better incentives. We also address the possibility that the 
rules themselves make things worse. 
B. The Effect of Delay and Rapidity Rules 
 Suppose that the delay rules we discussed in Part I have the following effect. If 
Congress seeks to legislate for period i, it must begin deliberating in period i-1. The rules 
thus preclude immediate legislation: Congress can legislate only for period 2 in our 
schema. Deferred legislation means that Congress deliberates in period 1 but enacts for 
period 2. 
 As noted above, any particular delay rule might specify delay of just a day or two; 
others, real or hypothetical, might require a delay of a longer period. Moreover, the effect 
of an apparently modest delay of a few days may be quite significant within the 
legislature, where time and agenda resources are scarce. Also, the cumulative effect of 
many different rules could be to cause considerable delay or limited delay. 
 Anticipatory and conditional legislation must be understood in a special way. If 
Congress must deliberate in period 1 in order to enact a statute in period 2, but then 
enacts anticipatory or conditional legislation, then those types of legislation go into effect 
only in period 3. More formally, if Congress seeks to legislate for period i, it must begin 
deliberating in period i-2, so that it can pass anticipatory or conditional legislation in 
period i-1, which takes effect in period i. 
 The delay rules have two opposing effects. At first sight, they would only seem to 
increase the probability of deferred legislation. If Congress cannot enact for period i, then 
it must enact for period i+1. If Congress believes that anticipatory or conditional 
legislation is warranted, it must deliberate in period i, enact for period i+1, and then wait 
until period i+2 for the law to take effect. This means that the benefits of the law are 
discounted twice from the perspective of period i. Deferred legislation, where discounting 
occurs only once, thus seems comparatively attractive. 
 Yet the delay rules can also increase the probability of anticipatory and 
conditional legislation. If Congress anticipates that it cannot enact for a certain period 
after a problem arises, because of the delay rules, it will act earlier to address this risk 
and, if necessary, delegate power to other decisionmakers who can act more quickly. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Snyder, Buying Supermajorities, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 303 (1996); Edward P. Schwartz & Warren 
Schwartz, Decisionmaking by Juries Under Unanimity and Supermajority Voting Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 775 
(1992). 
66 In some circumstances, delay could conceivably increase the costs of implementation if regulated parties 
engage in strategic behavior to try to raise implementation costs in the hopes of avoiding subsequent 
implementation.  
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Delay rules cause delay only in the first case; but they can also cause Congress to act 
quickly, in anticipation of problems, so as to avoid being forced to delay when problems 
arise. 
Which effect will predominate? As we have noted, deferred legislation is more 
attractive than anticipatory legislation if legislative costs are high, the importance of 
adjustment is low, and the probability that the public good will be valuable is low. 
Anticipatory legislation is more attractive than conditional legislation if the agency costs 
from delegating to another decisionmaker are high. 
Consider again our example. If we imagine that Congress first learns of the 
negative health effects of the pollution in period 1, then delay rules mean that it cannot 
enact immediate legislation. Deferred legislation enables the law to go into effect in 
period 2, so that the benefits are discounted only once. If, instead, Congress enacted 
anticipatory or conditional legislation, so as to allow parties to adjust, the benefits will 
not be felt until period 3. 
But in a more general sense Congress will realize at any given time that a new 
problem might arise in a future period. It knows that the delay rules will prevent it from 
addressing that problem immediately. So if it anticipates that pollution might be the 
source of future problems, it might, instead of waiting for the problem to arise, enact 
conditional legislation or even highly general anticipatory legislation. Conditional 
legislation delegates to the EPA, which then can respond quickly to the problem if 
necessary. 
Rapidity rules can be similarly understood. If a rapidity rule is in place, then 
Congress must address a problem with immediate legislation; deferred, conditional, and 
anticipatory legislation are off the table. Thus, rapidity rules force Congress to act 
quickly when it might otherwise be inclined to delay. There is also the possible contrary 
effect: once a rapidity rule is in place, Congress might respond by enacting anticipatory 
or conditional legislation so that it will not subsequently be rushed into making a 
decision.  
C. Internal Reasons for Regulating Timing 
Congress is a collective body, and is subject to the pathologies of collective 
action. Over the years, Congress has developed various rules, norms, and practices that, 
on the most optimistic account, overcome the problems of collective action and enable 
Congress to enact desirable laws. One hypothesis, then, is that delay rules are one way 
that Congress structures internal decisionmaking to avoid the pathologies of collective 
choice. 
1. Passion and Delay 
The usual explanation for delay rules like the three-reading rule is that Congress 
wants to constrain itself from acting out of temporary passion, and that the costs of bad 
legislation caused by passion are less than the benefits that are lost as a result of the 
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constraint on quick action.67 Because passion-induced law is more likely to be bad law, it 
is better to risk congressional inaction than to allow Congress to act quickly. 
This conventional wisdom has seriously difficulties. First, the types of stimulus 
that rouse Congress out of its stupor are just those types of problems that need quick 
congressional action. An emergency occurs: passion might interfere with rational 
legislative deliberation but careful deliberation is not desirable if time is of the essence. It 
is perverse to demand that the government come to a halt precisely when rapid 
governmental action is most needed.68 
Second, passion can provide needed motivation. The usual account of Congress 
stresses inertia rather than excessive action. To act, Congress must overcome a collective 
action problem, plus an effective supermajority rule. Congressional procedure is filled 
with hurdles that must be successively cleared to enact legislation. This means that the 
median voter will usually not have his or her way. Emotion is motivational, and passion 
might be just what is needed to overcome inertia caused by the individual rationality of 
members of Congress. If, as a collective body, Congress enacts desirable legislation too 
infrequently, delay rules that raise the costs of immediate action further exacerbate 
undesirable institutional tendencies.  
Third, it is just when Congress is most roused to passion that timing rules are least 
likely to constrain it. An impassioned Congress will waive internal rules and use clear 
statements in order to overcome interpretive presumptions imposed by the courts. The 
importance of maintaining internal rules on timing and otherwise will be most visible to 
Congress when it is in a deliberative rather than passionate state.69 
Fourth, Congress itself often addresses future emergencies and other passion-
inducing events by enacting conditional legislation during times of calm. Conditional 
legislation allows the executive to act without first obtaining legislative permission. The 
fact that something is being done by the government will reduce the pressure on Congress 
to act immediately. To the extent that passions temporarily addle congressional 
deliberation, the incentive to act immediately will at least be reduced. 
2. Group Polarization and Delay 
Despite these problems, the notion that delay rules enable people to overcome or 
mitigate deliberative pathologies retains a strong hold on intuition, and clearly underlies 
other areas of law, such as cooling-off laws that allow consumers to void contracts 
entered into under pressure.70 Perhaps, the overall intuition is correct but the mechanism 
                                                 
67 See Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 364 
(2004); JEREMY BENTHAM, POLITICAL TACTICS (M. James, C. Blamires, & C. Pease-Watkin, eds. 1999).  
68 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE 
COURTS 61-64 (2007). 
69 Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman On Emergency Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
631, 640-49 (2006).  
70 See generally Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 730, 774 (1989); Caroline O. Shoenberger, Consumer Myths v. Legal Realities: How Can Businesses 
Cope?, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 189, 213-14 (assembling consumer cooling off statutes). The FTC 
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has not been adequately identified; perhaps, for example, delay rules can weaken the 
effects of group polarization and other phenomena caused by cognitive biases. 
Group polarization refers to the empirically validated tendency of groups of like-
minded people to make collective decisions that are more extreme than the decisions to 
which the group members would come if they  voted independently.71 The phenomenon 
might not, at first sight, appear to be applicable to Congress, whose members are 
relatively heterogeneous, but it could certainly apply to some judgments of Congress, 
especially when decisions are initially made by a caucus of the majority party. One 
conjecture, then, is that delay rules could be a way of weakening the ill effects of group 
polarization and other decisionmaking pathologies. 
The question is what the mechanism of group polarization is, and whether delay 
rules would throw sand into it. Unfortunately, the mechanism is not well understood. One 
possibility draws on the idea of social comparison: people want to be perceived favorably 
by other members of a group, and they are perceived favorably if they share other group 
members’ views.72 The common desire for the favorable perceptions of others should 
create a feedback mechanism that drives people to the extreme. If so, it is hard to see how 
requiring delay prior to decision would improve outcomes. Instead, during the period of 
delay, people might have more time to bring their own views into alignment with the 
views of others. As Cass Sunstein notes, people who deliberate among themselves for a 
longer period of time might actually polarize to a greater extent.73 Perhaps, in this context 
a rapidity rule would be better, as it might force people to express their opinions before 
they have a chance to develop a confident sense of what the opinions of other people in 
the group are.  
 Group polarization can also occur through information pooling, which has been 
modeled using the assumption of rational actors rather than cognitively biased actors. 
“Information cascades” occur when individuals within a group imitate the expressed 
opinions of earlier speakers rather than express their own opinions because they 
rationally assume that those earlier opinions, when consistent, reflect more aggregate 
information than what they have individually, but with the result that less information (in 
the aggregate) is brought to bear on the decision than if people did not cascade.74 
Cascades provide a stronger case for delay rules than social comparison does because of a 
key fact about information pooling: cascades are fragile because they are vulnerable to 
small external shocks such as the disclosure of additional information through public 
processes. A delay rule, then, prevents the cascading members of Congress from acting 
and during this period of suspended action an external shock—information that comes 
out from the media or that is supplied by interest groups—could break the cascade. 
                                                                                                                                                 
provides for a three day cooling off period for door to door sales. 6 C.F.R. 429 (2004). The Federal Truth In 
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2003).  
71 See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000). 
72 Id. at 88. 
73 Id. at 74 (discussing “iterated polarization games”). 
74 See, e.g., Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and 
Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151 (1998). 
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Whether this case for delay rules is plausible is hard to say. Information cascades 
are not well understood, and any benefit must be weighed against the cost—namely the 
delay in the enactment of a law that turns out to be desirable. 
3. Agenda-Setting and Delay 
Another explanation is that delay weakens the agenda-setting power of agents in 
Congress who control the legislative process. Congressional officials, including leaders 
and committee chairs, are given agenda-setting power for various reasons.75 One 
influential theory suggests that, by delegating power to committee chairs, Congress gives 
them an incentive to invest in expertise, since committee members also have greater 
control of legislative outcomes, and thus can obtain extra rents that justify the 
investment.76 On this theory, legislative outcomes will be biased in favor of the interests 
of the committee chairs, but they will be better for Congress as a whole (since a majority 
must approve the legislation) than they would be if no one invested in the relevant 
expertise. The theory thus depends on a delicate tradeoff: one must give the officials 
some agenda-setting control (so they invest in expertise) but not too much (or legislative 
outcomes will be excessively biased).77 
An advantage of delay rules is that they give other members of Congress a chance 
to evaluate bills coming out of committee, and to organize opposition to those bills if they 
conclude that they are not generally beneficial. To avoid such opposition, committee 
chairs will draft bills that are less biased in favor of their own interests. Too much bias 
will generate too much opposition.  
One might argue that delay rules do no more than reduce the agenda-setting 
power of committee chairs, and thus could undermine the reason for delegating to 
committees in the first place—to provide committee members with an incentive to 
specialize and develop expertise.78 This is partly true, but the peculiar benefit of the delay 
                                                 
75 There are, of course, many ways of modeling the legislative process, costs, and internal organization of 
Congress. See generally KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991); Barry 
R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like 
Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132 (1988); Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85 (1987).  
76 Romer & Rosenthal, supra note 5. See also KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE 
ORGANIZATION (1991); David Austen-Smith & William Riker, Asymmetric Information and the Coherence 
of Legislation, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 897 (1987); David Austen-Smith, Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting 
Over Endogenous Agendas, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1323 (1987).  
77 For the moment, we set aside the view that legislators care exclusively about the policy domains within 
the jurisdiction of their respective committees. While committee members surely care more about their 
policy domain than the domain of other committees, we assume committee members also care about other 
policies. There is a robust literature in political science about whether committee preferences are “outliers” 
relative to the preferences of the floor. See, e.g., John Londregan & James M. Snuder, Jr., Comparing 
Committee and Floor Preferences, 19 LEG. STUD. Q. 233 (1994); Keith Krehbiel, Are Congressional 
Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?, 84 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 149 (1990).  
78 See Christine DeGregorio, Leadership Approaches in Congressional Committee Hearings, 45 W. POLIT. 
Q. 971, 978 (1992) (quoting an aide on the House Interior Committee: “In a lot of ways we are not the 
masters of our own fates. Things come to us that some thing must be done about. Right now it is the Price-
Anderson Act. It’s going to expire. There is a whole industry out there, and there are safe energy groups 
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rule—which distinguishes it from other rules that could be used to reduce agenda-setting 
power such as supermajority rules—is that it encourages informed opposition by 
members of Congress who can use extra time to obtain information. Committees will 
specialize less only to the extent that Congress exploits delay to inform itself more.  
 Delay rules have another advantage: they extend the time horizons of committee 
members by encouraging them to pass legislation that will have an effect only after they 
leave the committee. To the extent that members of committees might leave the 
committee in future terms and join other committees, they are more likely to take account 
of the general interest of Congress rather than their own narrow interest. Suppose, for 
example, that the chair of an agriculture committee wants to please farmers, but knows 
that because of delay rules, he can only push through bills that take effect next year and 
beyond, at which point he might be a member of the armed forces committee, when he 
depends less on the good will of farmers. Along this dimension, the impact of delay rules 
might change as a function of other congressional rules that allocate committee chairs. 
Chairmanships could be allocated either by seniority or on a rotating basis. Allocation by 
seniority creates an incentive for legislators to stay on committees rather than move from 
one committee to another. Allocation by rotation makes it more likely that committee 
membership will change from time to time. Delay rules might extend the time horizons of 
committee chairs in the seniority system but would not improve their incentives to take 
account of Congress’s general interest. They could have that effect in the rotation system. 
D. External Reasons for Regulating Timing 
External reasons refer to a different agency relationship—that between Congress 
and the public. The public elects Congress to pass legislation to serve the public’s 
interests, but for familiar reasons Congress might not do so. One reason is that interest 
groups are more organized than the general public, and thus they can better monitor 
members of Congress, and reward them (with campaign contributions and other 
assistance) if members of Congress enact laws that benefit interest groups at the expense 
of the public.79 Another reason is that members of Congress might have private 
ideological or careerist goals (such as reelection) that leads them to prefer legislation that 
benefits themselves at the expense of the public. Members of Congress have an interest, 
for example, in entrenching themselves by passing legislation that gives them electoral 
advantages—franking privileges, and the like. 
Timing rules could have two different functions. First, they might reduce these 
agency costs: timing rules are a partial solution to a central problem of democratic 
governance. Second, they might simply reflect these agency problems: that is, timing 
rules reflect the efforts of members of Congress to help interest groups or otherwise serve 
                                                                                                                                                 
that don’t want to see it expire. So, that’s our agenda and it’s big.”). See also Jack L. Walker, Setting the 
Agenda in the U.S. Senate: A Theory of Problem Selection, 7 BRIT. J. POLIT. SCI. 423, 443 (1977) 
(discussing the role of reauthorization proceedings in Senate committees).  
79 Consider David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks, Elections, Coalitions and Legislative Outcomes, 82 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 405 (1988); Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for 
Political Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983); Robert Barro, The Control of Politicians: An Economic 
Model, 14 PUB. CHOICE 19 (1973).  
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elected officials’ private interests in vindicating ideological preferences or ensuring 
reelection. 
1. Timing Rules as Solutions 
One possible role of delay rules is that of reducing the advantages of interest 
groups in the legislative process. Suppose that when problems reach the attention of elites 
and the public generally, it takes some time for affected groups to mobilize resources to 
influence Congress. Suppose further that organized interest groups mobilize resources 
more quickly than ordinary citizens, because organized interests maintain institutions and 
staffs that monitor events and react quickly.80 Interest groups will lobby Congress to act 
quickly before the general public can be mobilized in ad hoc style by political 
entrepreneurs. Once Congress legislates, the public will face a high barrier for obtaining 
its desired reform. If all this is true, then rules that require delay between when a problem 
is identified and when legislation may be enacted will weaken the relative power of 
interest groups, and thus increase the probability that publicly spirited legislation will be 
enacted.81 The rule affects the content of the legislation by affecting the timing of the 
legislation, and it does so in a desirable way if the influence of the general public 
naturally lags that of interest groups.82  
This point can be extended and made more general. Suppose, a delay rule failed to 
alter the eventual influence of interest groups over the content of a specific piece of 
legislation. Delay nonetheless may raise the probability of public awareness that such 
legislation has been enacted. If the public sanctions legislators for enacting private 
interest legislation, legislative responsiveness to private interest groups should lessen in 
the long term. The electoral sanction is crude because judgments about legislative 
performance on many dimensions must be aggregated into a single yes-no vote. Still, the 
threat of electoral sanctions seems to have some effect on legislative behavior. This long-
term effect is more likely when delay rules are accompanied by transparency rules, as 
they often are within the legislature. Three reading rules might be understood in this way, 
both slowing the legislative process and raising the costs of secret legislative action. This 
effect is prominent when delay rules are paired with sub-majority triggers. For example, 
Senate Rule XIV.2 requires that the three readings of a proposed bill be on different 
calendar days, generating delay with an extremely low trigger threshold (a single 
legislator). 
It is also possible that timing rules affect the price interest groups are willing to 
pay for legislation. Suppose, for example, that a delay rule prohibits immediate 
legislation. An interest group knows that an issue it cares about might arise at any period 
i, but it does not know when that will occur. Because of the delay rule, it cannot force 
                                                 
80 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).  
81 See generally Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Transparency in the Budget Process (unpublished 
manuscript, 2006).  
82 The converse might be true as well. Suppose the general public is organized enough to oppose legislation 
in the short-term. The logic of collective action problems suggests diffuse public interest coalitions will not 
only be more difficult to create initially, but also more difficult to sustain. In this example, a delay rule 
would benefit the private interest if the opposing public coalition collapses during the interim time period.  
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Congress to pass a law in period i. If it waits until period i, and then acts, it can obtain the 
law for period i+1, but the benefits will be discounted, so the law might not be worth the 
lobbying costs. If the group instead acts prior to i by encouraging Congress to enact 
anticipatory or conditional legislation, it faces further costs. Because the problem is not 
yet known, anticipatory legislation will need to be very broad, which means that other 
interest groups might object, and so passage will be more difficult. When anticipatory 
legislation is used, there is also a risk that a legislature in period i+1 will defect from the 
original deal and repeal the legislation.83 Conditional legislation introduces another 
decisionmaker, such as an agency, which might not take the interest group’s view. Thus, 
the interest group will have to expend additional effort trying to influence the agency, 
reducing the value of the initial legislation. In all these ways, timing rules might make 
legislation less attractive to interest groups, though it is important to emphasize that it 
could also make public spirited legislation less effective as well. 
A related possibility is that delay rules uniquely hinder interest groups, creating a 
screen that blocks at least some bad laws but lets through public spirited laws. Suppose 
that bad laws require lobbying by interest groups. Lobbying typically takes a lot of 
money, with big lobbying investments taking place in advance of passage of the bill. And 
suppose, by contrast, that good laws are not generally the result of lobbying or influence 
by the public, but instead are initiated by members of Congress who want to improve 
their chances for reelection by improving the economy, security, and other things that 
people care about. Delay rules have the effect of increasing the spread of time between 
the lobbying investment and the legislative return, thus reducing the rate of return on the 
lobbying effort. By contrast, delay rules should have no similar effect on publicly spirited 
bills. If there is no ex ante lobbying investment, delay cannot reduce the value of that 
investment. 
We should add that the pure form of deferred legislation, whether or not 
compelled by strong delay rules, is a species of veil of ignorance rules.84 A veil of 
ignorance rule is “a rule that suppresses self-interested behavior on the part of 
decisionmakers; it does so by subjecting the decisionmakers to uncertainty about the 
distribution of benefits and burdens that will result from a decision.”85 One way of doing 
so is imposing delay or deferred implementation.86 In their strongest form, delay rules 
                                                 
83 See John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 INTL. REV. L. 
& ECON. 263, 266 (1992) (“Except in the rare case of a constitutional amendment, today’s legislature cannot 
prevent a future legislature’s majority from overturning its wishes.”). See also Robert D. Tollison, Public 
Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey, Winstar, Bureaucracy and Public 
Choice, 6 S. CT. ECON. REV. 173 (1998) (discussing legislative durability and price of legislation). Cf. 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 
J. L. & ECON. 875, 833 (1975) (explaining that the maximum price that an interest group will be willing to 
pay depends in part on the possibility of “adverse judicial rulings”).  
84 See Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399 (2001).  
85 Id. at 399.  
86 Id. at 408 (“delay of the effective date of a rule, which restricts the range of a decision’s future 
application of the long term, rather than the short term, in the hope that decisionmakers’ long-term interests 
are inherently unpredictable.” ). Cf. Ariel Porat & Omri Yadlin, Promoting Consensus in Society Through 
Deferred-Implementation Agreements, 56 U. TORONTO L. J. 151 (2006).  
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have a veil-like effect. Deferred legislation requires enacting legislation in period i that 
will not distribute benefits until period i+j. When the interim period is long, individuals 
may not know in period i what their position will be in period i+j. Veil rules may thus 
directly affect the motivation of legislators in desirable ways, making it more difficult to 
make decisions on the basis of narrow self interest.87 Alternatively, the delay subset of 
veil rules may also facilitate good legislative behavior by making it easier for the public 
to monitor legislators and easier for members of Congress to monitor committee 
members. These desirable effects result from delay’s impact on agency problems, rather 
than by draping a veil between legislators and the effects of legislation.  
2. Timing Rules as Problems 
Timing rules help mitigate certain agency problems in politics, but they also 
create new ones. Suppose that only interest groups monitor Congress and the public is 
largely passive. Delay rules might be a way of ensuring that interest groups have an 
opportunity to learn about, and influence, developments in the legislative process. 
Congress might fear that if it acts too quickly, interest groups that do not have a chance to 
provide input will be unhappy with the results. Delay rules slow down legislation so that 
interest groups can have influence. Perhaps some of these groups will have a desirable 
influence, but public choice provides many reasons to think otherwise.88 While delay has 
the appearance of generating desirable deliberative benefits in Congress, the reality is 
darker. Delay simply generates greater opportunities for negative influence by private 
interests or rent-extraction by legislators. Moreover, because delay rules facilitate 
monitoring, delay makes it easier for interest groups to monitor legislators as well as the 
public. Rapidity rules have a dark side as well. Forcing rapid legislative action may 
generate errors in policy, reduce transparency, undermine monitoring, make back-room 
legislative deals easier, and so on. If delay generally helps mitigate agency problems, 
then rapidity is likely to exacerbate them. Timing rules might serve the negative interests 
of legislators or private groups.  
This view has plausibility in some policy domains, but it is a bit too crude to 
describe timing rules in general. First, a now-conventional view is that legislation 
involves many variants. Different sorts of legislation generate different distributions of 
costs and benefits to private actors.89 Environmental legislation produces concentrated 
costs on industry and diffuse benefits to the public. Tax policy often pits concentrated 
interest against concentrated interest. The underlying interest group dynamics will vary 
across different policy areas and the effects of timing rules will vary accordingly. If, on a 
theory of the optimal timing of legislative action delay is bad in a specific policy domain, 
a natural suggestion is that rapidity rules are good.  
The difficulty is that timing rules can be manipulated to serve either good or bad 
ends. If timing rules affect the nature of legislation, timing can be manipulated to make 
                                                 
87 For example, consider the setting of legislative salaries. See Vermeule, supra note 84, at 404.  
88 See generally DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (Cambridge 2003).  
89 See WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, PHILIP FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 59 (3d ed. 2002). 
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policy worse instead of better. This concern is legitimate, but it is no more legitimate 
with respect to timing rules than most of features of political institutions. Transparency is 
often democratically desirable, but too much transparency in the wrong circumstances 
(e.g. national security) can be harmful. Closed rules, which prohibit amendments to 
pending legislation, can be used to prevent nongermane amendments on other topics or 
amendments that weaken the bill, but they can also be used to avoid amendments that 
would fix or strengthen the bill. Timing rules are similar in this respect; they can be used 
for good or for ill. The design task is to calibrate timing rules to the specific context. This 
task is not easy, but our analysis suggests it is important.  
  
III. EXTENSIONS 
A. The Relationship Between Timing Rules and Other Procedural Rules 
Timing rules compose a portion of a larger class of procedural rules, rules that 
determine how a decisionmaker comes to a decision but not what the content of that 
decision is. Constitutional procedural rules, for example, provide that bills become law 
only if majorities in both houses vote in favor of them, or two thirds if the President 
exercises the veto. Statutory procedural rules like those contained in the Congressional 
Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974,90 establish detailed procedural requirements with 
deadlines for the specification of a congressionally proposed budget.91 The timeline is 
accompanied by procedural restrictions, for example, precluding nongermane amendment 
(otherwise permitted) in the Senate,92 or making it out of order to increase spending 
beyond that authorized in the concurrent budget resolution.93 Internal procedural rules 
include the filibuster rules, and other rules that govern the order in which a chamber does 
business, who gets the floor, what type of majority is needed to approve a motion, and so 
forth. 
The relationship between timing rules and the other types of procedural rules is 
complex. An initial source of confusion is the substitutability of timing rules and many 
voting rules—an issue we addressed in Part I under the heading of “waiver.” Consider 
Senate Rule XIV.1, which provides that “Whenever a bill or joint resolution shall be 
offered, its introduction shall, if objected to, be postponed for one day.” At least in 
                                                 
90 Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297.  
91 See generally Chryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax Legislative Process, 
43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 872-73 (2002).  
92 2 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (as applied to concurrent budget resolutions); id. § 641(e)(1) (as applied to 
reconciliation bills).  
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principle, the Senate could change this rule by a supermajority vote,94 suspend the rule by 
majority vote with notice,95 or suspend the rule by unanimous consent without notice,96 in 
which case the rule does not force delay at all. If a majority supports the bill, then it can 
first suspend the rule (assuming 60 Senators vote for cloture), and then vote in favor of 
the bill; if a majority rejects the bill, then the rule has no effect in any case. We suggested 
in Part I that reputational concerns might prevent this type of behavior. If members of a 
chamber believe that timing rules make sense in general, they may refrain from 
undermining the effectiveness of these rules by suspending them whenever they interfere 
with the immediate enactment of a bill they favor. 
Supposing this is the case, then it seems clear that the timing rules and the other 
types of procedural rules address different types of problems, although these problems 
might be closely related. Consider, for example, a simple comparison of a supermajority 
rule that provides that a bill passes a chamber only if a supermajority votes for it, and a 
delay rule that provides that a bill passes a chamber only if a majority votes for it twice—
at an initial period 1 and then after delay, at period 2.97 
To understand the effects of these rules, imagine that members’ political 
preferences can be distributed along a line segment, with extremes at the end and the 
median in the middle. Suppose two bills are under consideration: one would reduce 
funding for family planning and one would eliminate funding for family planning. The 
median member of (say) the House favors reduction of funds, but the member who would 
be needed for a supermajority favors no reduction. Thus, if the supermajority rule is in 
place, no law will be passed. 
At first sight, the delay rule would seem to allow the law to be passed. If the 
median member of the House supports the law, then under majority rule the law passes. 
However, the truth is more complicated. The reason is that the identity of the median 
voter can fluctuate over time, and the requirement of two votes implies that the median 
voter at both time periods support the bill. Given the possibility that a person who 
supports the bill the first time might oppose it the second time, an effective supermajority 
is necessary for the bill to survive. 
An example will clarify the argument. Suppose that all members’ preferences for 
the reduction in funds remain fixed between period 1 and period 2 except that of one 
person. Let us assume that N people favor the status quo and N people favor the reduction 
                                                 
94 And arguably a bare majority, depending on one’s interpretation of the Senate Rules. Various procedural 
gambits are surveyed in the commentary on the filibuster. See generally GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC 
SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER: OBSTRUCTION & LAWMAKING IN THE U.S. SENATE (Princeton 2006).  
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96 Senate Rule V.1 (“Any rule may be suspended without notice by the unanimous consent of the Senate, 
except as otherwise provided by the rules.”).  
97 Note that in the case of deferred legislation, there need not be literally two votes. The legislature waits 
during period 1 and votes during period 2. But in practice some action must take place during period 1—the 
bill is introduced for example—and the legislature can vote to block further consideration, so in practice a 
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in funds. The remaining person—the potential tie-breaker—favors the status quo with 
probability 0.5, and favors reduction in funds with probability 0.5, reflecting the 
ambiguous balance of political forces in her district. (We might also imagine that in the 
interim she could be voted out of office and replaced.) If the bill is subject to a single 
vote, then the probability that it is enacted is 0.5. But if the bill must pass two votes 
separated by a delay, and the middle voter simply votes in favor of the position reflected 
by the balance of political forces in her district each time, then the probability that the 
vote will pass falls to 0.25. Thus, two majority votes separated by delay together with 
variance in preferences is effectively much stricter than a single majority vote or two 
majority votes that occur in rapid succession. 
However, an interesting property of the dual vote system is that the effect of 
timing is variable. The effective strength of the voting rule increases with the variance of 
political preferences with respect to the relevant issue. If preferences are stable, then the 
median voter stays the same, in which case the second vote will be exactly the same as 
the first vote, and the overall probability of enactment is 0.5. If preferences are highly 
variable, the overall probability of enactment could fall, as we have seen, to 0.25. By 
contrast, a (for example) supermajority rule with no temporal dimension might be hard to 
satisfy in general, but its effect remains constant with respect to variability in 
preferences.98 
Should this difference matter? One can imagine situations where it would. 
Suppose that one of the benefits of a supermajority rule is that it prevents legislative 
churning—the excessive enactment and repeal of laws because of rapid changes in 
political coalitions. The cost of the rule is, of course, that many desirable bills will not 
pass because a supermajority cannot be constructed. The dual voting rule solves the 
churning problem without requiring such high decision costs when the conditions for 
churning do not exist. When preferences are variable and thus churning is a danger, the 
dual voting rule is an effective supermajority rule. When preferences are not variable, 
then churning is less of a danger, and thus the dual voting rule, by serving as an effective 
(simple) majority voting rule, allows legislation to proceed. To be sure, the requirement 
of two votes and a delay raises decision costs, and so the overall assessment of the rule 
would require one to take account of delay and multiple-voting costs as well. 
Our purpose here is not to prove that timing rules are better than voting rules or 
vice versa. Clearly, both types of rules are needed. Our more limited aim is to show that 
timing rules have distinctive and sometimes attractive properties, and that these 
properties may explain why timing rules constitute an important subset of procedural 
rules. 
B. Enforcement 
                                                 
98 In our example, the law would not pass a supermajority rule because we assume that, except for the 
median voter, preferences are fixed. But suppose instead that everyone votes for the bill with probability 
0.9. Then a supermajority rule will be satisfied less often than a non-temporal majority rule will. One could 
then construct a dual majority vote system whose strictness exceeds that of the supermajority rule when the 
temporal variability of the median voter’s preference is high and not when it is low. 
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For timing rules to have meaningful effects on legislation, the rules must be 
enforced, either by Congress itself, the President, or the courts. None of these alternatives 
is without problems. Internal enforcement of rules by legislators constitutes a self-
regulation regime in which regulated parties can waive the regulations. External 
enforcement of restrictions on congressional procedure is notoriously difficult. However, 
if each institution is capable of partial enforcement, timing rules can still produce 
important effects on legislative outcomes. Indeed, there are several reasons exist to think 
enforcement of timing rules will be easier and more effective than restrictions on the 
content of legislation.  
1. Congressional Enforcement  
Suppose no external actor is capable of enforcing timing rules. Congress might 
nonetheless self-regulate and enforce timing rules. Earlier we suggested that reputation 
and a generic norm in favor of rule-following in Congress might be sufficient to enforce 
timing rules, at least sometimes. An alternative to reputation and norms alone would be to 
give the Rules Committee in either House some sort of special enforcement authority. 
One alternative would include the responsibility to issue a public report every time 
legislation is passed without satisfying the timing rules;99 another would be to grant 
authority to file ethics charges against legislators voting for a bill that failed to satisfy 
timing rules. But for the regime to work, the Rules committee would have to have good 
incentives—refusing to look the other way—when the rest of Congress has bad 
incentives. This is possible, but unlikely, at least absent a mechanism for altering the 
incentives of a discrete subset of legislators. If the rules committee faces the same 
incentives as the rest of Congress, then generic norms backed by reputation may be the 
only viable congressional enforcement scheme. Nor is it clear that ethics charges or 
(more modestly) a public pronouncement whenever a timing rule is violated would be a 
wise use of Congressional resources. One might “statutize” timing rules to make them 
more binding. Virtually all statutes that fix procedural rules also contain a clause making 
disclaiming any limitation on the constitutional authority of each house to make its own 
rules, but using statutes without such disclaimers remains a possibility. Such statutes 
would likely vest courts with the authority to enforce procedural rules, a possibility that 
we discuss below. 
Although Congressional enforcement of timing rules is imperfect, it is 
theoretically possible. A long tradition in Constitutional law suggests that Congress must 
interpret the Constitution for itself rather than rely on judicial judgment and 
enforcement.100 If the argument has vitality in the context of constitutional interpretation, 
there is no reason to assume that congressional enforcement of timing rules would be 
impossible. Nor is it clear that internal enforcement of timing rules is any more difficult 
                                                 
99 As is currently done for legislation appropriating funds that are not authorized. 
100 See, e.g., James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 
7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). For more recent discussions, see Thomas C. Grey, Thayer’s Doctrine: Notes 
on its Origin, Scope, and Present Implications, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 28 (1993); Stephen B. Presser, On 
Tushnet the Burkean and in Defense of Nostalgia, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 42 (1993); and Mark Tushnet, 
Thayer’s Target: Judicial Review of Democracy, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 9 (1993).  
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than congressional enforcement of any of its rules. Although rules are regularly waived, 
they are also regularly adhered to and enforced.  
2. Presidential Enforcement 
Might the President be a more effective enforcer of timing rules? Suppose the 
President proclaimed that he would veto any legislation that failed to satisfy relevant 
timing rules, either because the rules were waived explicitly by a House of Congress or 
implicitly, as when a chamber ignores the timing rules. If the President could credibly 
make this pronouncement, it would constitute a partial fix for the enforcement problem. 
Unfortunately, in most cases a presidential statement like this one is not credible. And 
even if the President would like to hold himself to the statement, we know of no legal 
mechanism that would allow him to do so in a credible way. 
When Congress passes a bill without satisfying timing rules, the President must 
choose between the status quo ante (without the new bill) and the proposed bill.101 So 
long as the proposed bill is closer to the President’s ideal point than the status quo of no 
new legislation, the President’s short term interest will be to sign the bill rather than veto 
it. While there may be circumstances in which the President would take the short-term 
loss to obtain a long-term gain, we think it unlikely that enforcement of timing rules 
constitutes such a case. Indeed, even if the President were (somehow) 50 percent more 
likely to veto legislation that failed to satisfy relevant timing rules, Congress could 
simply adjust the content of legislation to make it more attractive to the President. So 
long as the enforcement of timing rules constitutes a substantive policy value, we are 
hard pressed to see why the President would not simply bargain around the outcome, 
trading the enforcement of timing rules for some other policy goal. Additionally, if the 
President could credibly commit to vetoing any piece of legislation that failed to satisfy 
relevant timing rules, enforcement would still be imperfect because Congress could 
override the President’s veto, in effect, choosing to reassert its initial timing rules waiver. 
Thus, while Presidential enforcement of timing rules might be a marginal improvement 
on congressional self-enforcement, it is unlikely to be a significant fix.  
3. Judicial Enforcement  
If Congress and the President are imperfect enforcers of timing rules, would 
courts be better? Although this is not the place for a critique or defense of judicial review, 
the case for judicial enforcement of timing rules is stronger than in many other areas of 
the law. For example, even if one supports judicial review of statutes for constitutionality, 
it is uncontroversial that courts sometimes struggle with the task of substantive review. If 
a statute is reviewed under the rational-basis test, it is virtually always upheld; if the 
strict-scrutiny standard is applied, the statute is almost always struck down. In part, this is 
because of the decisional burdens imposed by doctrine that asks judges to determine 
whether a state interest is “compelling enough” or whether a statute is “related enough,” 
for example, to interstate commerce. When called upon to evaluate the substance or 
                                                 
101 See John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressioanal Influence on Bureaucracy, 6 J. L. & ECON. 1 
(1990). 
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merits of legislation, courts regularly struggle, not because of ineptitude, but because of 
the nature of the inquiry doctrine requires.  
Identifying whether certain procedural requirements were met in the legislative 
process is relatively straightforward (although identifying instances of genuine waiver 
rather than rule-flouting may not be).102 The rules versus standards debate in the legal 
literature suggests related reasons that judges may good at enforcing timing rules. A 
deadline imposes low decision costs on the enforcing judge; compare a rule that requires 
agency action “in a reasonable time period.” In general, if one thinks judges are good at 
judicial review of statutes, there is every reason to think that judges will be better at 
enforcing timing rules than substantive restrictions on congressional power. If one is 
skeptical about judicial competence in substantive judicial review, there is reason to be 
less skeptical about judicial enforcement of timing rules.  
This is also true in other areas of the law. For example, an important debate in 
administrative law concerns whether judges should review the substance of policy 
decisions by administrative agencies or instead hold agencies to exacting procedures 
designed to ensure good decisions.103 Historically, one side of this debate urged that 
judges should steep themselves in technical knowledge and evaluate the content of 
agency judgments; the other side urged that judges could not possible make informed 
judgments about such matters, but could still make policy better by aggressively 
enforcing procedural restrictions on agency decisions.104 Our thesis picks up on this old 
strain of debate, suggesting that judicial competence is better tailored to the enforcement 
of procedural restraints like timing rules than substantive review of legislation. 
A problem for our view is that courts have often refused to enforce Congressional 
rules of procedure.105 Given our suggestion that courts could do so cheaply and 
effectively, this brute fact might be unsettling. However, to say that judges usually do not 
enforce Congressional rules is not to say that they should not do so. If legislators 
conclude enforcement of timing rules would have desirable influences on policy, 
congressional intent would be a reason for judges to enforce rather than ignore timing 
                                                 
102 See Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976).  
103 See, e.g., National Resources Defense Council v Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 547 F.2d 633, 653 
(D.C. Cir. 1976), rev’d sub nom, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).  
104 Chief Judge Bazelon thought courts were not well equipped to evaluate complicated scientific 
judgments by agencies, but could make decisions better by enforcing procedural restrictions on agencies. 
Judge Leventhal thought that judges could and should steep themselves in science to evaluate the merits of 
agency decisions. Compare Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, C.J., 
concurring) (“Because substantive review of evidence by technically illiterate judges is dangerously 
unreliable, I continue to believe we will do more to improve administrative decision-making by 
concentrating our efforts on strengthening administrative procedures . . . .”), with id. at 69 (Leventhal, J., 
concurring) (“Our present system of review assumes judges will acquire whatever technical knowledge is 
necessary as background for decision of the legal questions.”); see also NRDC v. United States, 547 F.2d 
633, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, C.J., separate statement concurring). 
105 Courts often rely on the “enrolled bill rule” which precludes judges from looking behind the enrolled 
bill to evaluate procedural defects. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 408 (1990) (Scalia, J, 
concurring in the judgment).  
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rules. Unlike many internal congressional rules that either serve mundane ends or that 
Congress would clearly prefer courts not enforce, timing rules serve ends that facilitate 
democratic governance. If courts prefer not to enforce internal rules out of respect for 
coordinate branches or congressional preferences, timing rules might constitute a special 
case warranting an exception. If courts are nonetheless hesitant, the simplest way to 
facilitate judicial enforcement would be for Congress to enact a statute directing courts to 
enforce the rules.106  
Moreover, judicial refusal to enforce congressional rules of procedure does not 
preclude judicial enforcement of all timing rules. At a minimum, judges could and should 
enforce constitutional timing rules and statutory timing rules. Judicial reluctance to 
enforce congressional rules might be a reason to codify timing rules in statutes or 
constitutions, rather than a reason to eschew judicial enforcement altogether. Indeed, 
courts regularly enforce constitutional procedural requirements.107 Many state courts also 
enforce other procedural restrictions far more unwieldy than timing rules. Single-subject 
rules are a prime example. Many state constitutions (and some statutes) contain clauses 
prohibiting legislation on more than one unrelated subject.108 Ascertaining whether a 
given law runs afoul of a single subject limitation is notoriously difficult, but state courts 
enforce the procedural limitation anyway. One reason state courts struggle with this task 
is that single-subject limits require judges to make substantive evaluations about how 
closely linked different parts of legislation are; single subject rules are procedural 
restrictions that require content-based evaluations for enforcement. Because the 
enforcement of timing rules does not, timing rules are likely to be cheaper and easier to 
enforce than existing content-based procedural restrictions.109  
None of these institutional actors—Congress, the President, or the courts—will be 
perfect enforcers of timing rules; but, each is capable of partial enforcement. A mix of 
reputation, norms, and internal sanctions provides Congress with some enforcement 
resources. Although the President is unlikely to credibly commit to wield his veto to 
enforce timing rules, perhaps a greater presidential emphasis on clearing timing rule 
hurdles would support relevant congressional norms. Most timing rules enforcement is 
likely to be done by the courts. The pitfalls of judicial enforcement are not trivial, but nor 
are they so severe to warrant outright rejection of the regime. At a minimum, there are 
                                                 
106 Cf. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085 
(2002).  
107 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954-55 (1987).  
108 The single subject rule has a long and storied tradition. For example, the Lex Caecilia Didia forbid laws 
consisting of unrelated subjects in Rome starting 98 B.C. ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATURE PROCEDURES 548-
49 (1922). See generally Millard H. Rudd, No law Shall Embrace More than One Subject, 42 MINN. L. 
REV. 389 (1958).  
109 Judicial enforcement of statutory timing rules is also tangentially related to questions about the timing of 
judicial review more generally. Compare Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency 
Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (198, 
233 (1994); JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990); with Mark 
Seidenfeld, Playing Games with the Timing of Judiical Review: An Evaluation of Proposals to Restrict Pre-
enforcement Review of Agency Rules, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 86 (1997).  
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good reasons to think courts would be more willing and more able to enforce timing rules 
than other forms of limitations on congressional action.  
C. Retroactivity 
To this point, we have focused on legislation that is exclusively prospective. The 
possibility of retroactive legislation affects our analysis in several ways.110 Like delay 
rules, a requirement of prospectivity may reduce the effects of narrow self-interest on 
decisions because circumstances may change in the future.111 Because actors know the 
past, but are uncertain about the future, a ban on retroactivity could reduce the ability of 
actors to narrowly tailor law to their own self-interest, at least at the margin. The legal 
bias against retroactive legislation is consistent with our theory of delay rules in that both 
delay rules and the presumption against retroactivity sometimes make it more difficult to 
enact legislation that pays off private interests. However, the effects of delay and 
prospectivity are independent. 
Another way of putting this point is that Congress could undermine the beneficial 
effects of delay rules if it can enact retroactive legislation too easily. Earlier, we 
suggested that delay rules facilitate monitoring of agents by the public, and reduce the 
relative influence of interest groups over legislation. Delay allows slow and diffuse 
public attention to mobilize, reducing the advantage of well organized groups in the 
legislative process. However, public attention is often short-lived. Once public attention 
wanes, private interests can lobby again. Suppose that the delay in period i mobilizes the 
public to oppose a bill successfully that gives a tax benefit to the energy industry; no 
legislation is enacted in period i. By period i+1, public attention has waned, but the 
attention of industry has not. If the industry can now lobby and obtain legislation in 
period i+1 that applies retroactively to period i, the delay rule will not have prevented 
“bad” legislation during period i. Retroactivity, therefore, allows actors to evade some 
timing rules. The bias in the law against retroactivity may support the democracy-
enhancing facets of delay rules on the legislative process.112  
Timing rules may also encourage legislators to rely on retroactive legislation. If 
strong delay rules make immediate legislation costly, legislators will rely on deferred, 
conditional, or anticipatory legislation. If private actors or legislators prefer that benefits 
be accrued for activity during period i, when delay rules prohibit it, retroactive legislature 
                                                 
110 The retroactivity literature is vast. See generally SHAVIRO, supra note 1; Kaplow, supra note 1; Graetz, 
supra note 1.  
111 See Vermeule, supra note 84, at 408-09.  
112 Judges routinely presume that statutes are not intended to have retroactive effects, absent a clear 
statement to the contrary. Landsgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1944); Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 
343, 352 (1999). The only Constitutional ban is the Ex Post Facto Clause. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No 
Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed”); U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl 1 (“No State shall . . . 
pass any Bill of Attainder [or] ex post factor Law . . .”). See generally, Vermeule, supra note 6, at 409-10. 
The Constitution prohibits federal and state legislatures from enacting retroactive punishments, Weaver v. 
Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981), but not civil laws. See generally Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary 
Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143 (1996). Courts presume that 
agencies do not have the authority to issue retroactive rules. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 
U.S. 204 (1988). 
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enacted in period i+1 will be more attractive, all else equal. If retroactivity is bad (for 
reasons outside our framework), then either a presumption against retroactivity or weaker 
delay rules could reduce the frequency of retroactive legislation. The basic point is that 
timing rules can make retroactive legislation more attractive to legislators and 
retroactivity can undermine the effect of some timing rules. 
A related topic is legal transitions. Scholars have long debated whether people 
whose wealth declines as a result of legal change should be compensated.113 The simplest 
setting is the taking of private property, but the basic arguments apply to any kind of 
legal change, such as regulatory change. On the one hand, compensating people for their 
losses provides them with insurance that might not be available in the market, and might 
cause the government to internalize the costs of its actions. For example, when the 
government condemns land for a new highway, property owners should anticipate this 
risk and be insured, and the government should be forced to take account of the costs as 
well as benefits of the highway. On the other hand, compensating people for their losses 
reduces their incentive to anticipate the changing needs of society and future government 
projects, with the result that they will overinvest in their property. In addition, if they 
want insurance against potential takings, they may be able to purchase it from private 
insurance companies. At the same time, it is far from clear that a compensation 
requirement causes the government to internalize the costs of its actions when taxpayers, 
rather than government officials themselves, pay these costs. 
The debate has proceeded so far as though the only alternatives were full 
compensation (“just compensation” under the fifth amendment) or no compensation at 
all. However, delay rules provide an intermediate approach. With respect to the 
government, a delay requirement extends its time horizons, and increases the probability 
that a condemnation planned today will not occur until after the next election. Property 
owners have a chance to mobilize, and if there is some probability that a new party will 
take power, the delay rule reduces the risk that condemnations will be pursued for 
partisan reasons. Delay does not directly compensate the property owner, of course, but it 
will increase her bargaining power with respect to the government, which may be willing 
to pay her to sell quickly. A delay rule therefore provides more compensation than none 
at all.  
D. Delegation of Regulatory Powers to the Executive Branch 
Timing rules also implicate a range of important issues concerning delegation to 
the executive branch. In our framework, delegation to the bureaucracy is a form of 
conditional legislation, where the administrative agency evaluates whether the benefit of 
the legislation is greater than the costs. Delegation of this decision to an agency entails 
the standard laundry list of problems generated by principal-agent models.114 At a 
                                                 
113 See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 1; Kaplow, supra note 1; Graetz, supra note 1. 
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minimum, the agent might err; it might act strategically; it may have interests that diverge 
from Congress; or it may shirk. To these existing insights, our argument suggests 
delegation is a form of timing legislation and also a function of timing rules.115 Congress 
enacts legislation immediately, but any benefit or future sanction is evaluated and 
specified by the administrative agency. As we have suggested, strong delay rules may 
increase pressure on the legislatures to enact legislation in early time periods, with details 
filled in by agents in the future. Delegation can be made more or less likely by adjusting 
timing rules.  
Related, Congress also uses a range of timing mechanisms to regulate the timing 
of agency actions, speeding up or slowing down the timing of bureaucratic decisions. 
Some of these timing mechanisms are explicit. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 
established a detailed timeline for EPA generation of regulations of specific air pollutants 
and designation of areas.116 For example, the Act required that governors submit area 
designations (attainment versus nonattainment) no later than one year after the 
promulgation of a new national ambient air quality standard,117 but the Administrator 
may not require the list sooner than 120 days after the new standard is promulgated.118 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires the Federal Communications Commission 
to review the degree of competition in the telecommunications industry every three years 
and adjust regulations accordingly.119 Many organic statutes contain delayed 
implementation clauses that provide 30-90 days before newly promulgated agency rules 
go into effect. Other agency timing rules are de facto. When Congress requires a decision 
on the record after an opportunity for a hearing, the statute triggers the time-consuming 
formal rulemaking and formal adjudication requirements of sections 556-557 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act.120 Even informal notice-and-comment rulemaking is time-
consuming, taking months or years, rather than days.121 Perhaps these provisions of the 
APA should be understood as timing rules as well.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 439 (1989) 
(discussing how agencies can shift policy outcomes away from the legislative intent). 
115 Cf. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Police Patrol Congressional Oversight Overlooked: 
Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POLIT. SCI. 165 (1984). 
116 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399. 
117 42 U.S.C § 7407(d)(1)(A).  
118 Id. § 7407(d)(1)(B). 
119 Section 11 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, requires the Federal Communications 
Commission to review all of its regulations applicable to providers of telecommunications services in every 
even-numbered year, beginning in 1998, to determine whether the regulations are no longer in the public 
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120 42 U.S.C. §§ 556-557.  
121 42 U.S.C. § 553. See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 59, 65 (1995); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992).  
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Whether explicit or implicit, delay rules of this sort serve many of the same 
interests in the administrative context as in the legislative context. Delay allows the 
principal (Congress) to better monitor the agent’s (bureaucracy) decisions. Delay rules 
also allow the public time to organize and monitor, thus potentially reducing the 
influence of interest groups over the formation of regulation. However, both delay rules 
and rapidity rules are important. Either because agencies get captured by the interests 
they regulate (who may prefer no regulation) or because agents might shirk (and prefer 
inaction), deadlines on administrative process and decisions are equally important for 
controlling behavior. The agent might make a poor evaluation of whether B>C, or simply 
be lazy and be slow in making the determination. Because benefits are discounted, delay 
after the true value of B is realized imposes pure costs and no additional benefit.122 For 
example, the Toxic Substances Control Act123 requires the agency to issue initial 
recommendations for listing of toxic substances within nine months.124 
Although we have focused on the legislature, the basic analysis can be applied 
with equal force to the bureaucracy. Although many components of the administrative 
process are regulated by Congress and courts, agency flexibility to choose the form and 
timing of decision is still the rule. Agencies are free to choose between rulemaking and 
adjudication,125 between formal and informal rulemaking,126 between making new policy 
immediately legal binding or only tentatively so.127 There is nothing to preclude an 
agency from adopting its own procedural timing rules. Analogues to the typology of 
legislation also exist. The agency equivalent to conditional legislation is the Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, followed by a Final Rule. The NPRM announces that they agency 
will address a policy problem and proposes a tentative rule or regulation. At the end of 
notice-and-comment, the agency adopts the rule if the benefits of the rule exceed the 
costs. The rule generally applies prospectively in the period of final adoption. An agency 
might also rely on interim final rules that are binding and in place until “final” final rules 
are enacted and upheld. This sequence is a rough analogue to the use of anticipatory 
legislation that can be repealed in period 2, except that the interim rules are in force 
during period 1. Thus, administrative agencies face many of the same choices about the 
optimal timing of regulation, and the constraints thereon. 
Another example that has received a great deal of attention in the literature is 
President Reagan’s Executive Order 12,291, which required agencies to submit certain 
regulations for review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the 
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Office of Management and Budget (OMB) within the executive branch.128 OMB review 
was supposed to ensure that agency regulations complied with cost-benefit analysis, but 
many critics believed that it was intended merely to delay regulation by requiring it to 
survive an extra layer of bureaucratic scrutiny by an intentionally understaffed office.129 
President Reagan’s anti-regulatory philosophy lent credence to this charge, but President 
Clinton preserved OMB review because it gave him greater control over the regulatory 
process.130 However, if OMB review was an implicit delay rule, Clinton partly countered 
this effect by issuing a rapidity rule, requiring that OMB review take no more than ninety 
days.131 
Indeed, the evidence does suggest that timing is an important choice variable in 
regulation. Interest groups try to delay regulations that burden them; Congress tries to 
slow down and speed up regulations depending on their political value; and regulatory 
agencies themselves time regulations in response to pressures from interest groups, 
Congress, and others.132 Thus, it would not be surprising if the President tried to counter 
these pressures by imposing timing rules of his own. 
If we think of OMB review as a pure delay rule, albeit shortened by President 
Clinton, it is susceptible to our analysis above. Delay does reduce the value of regulation 
by pushing its benefits off to the future—and anti-regulatory bias could well be the 
reason why President Reagan enhanced OMB review in the first place. But a delay rule 
also could have the beneficial effects that we have itemized. First, it allows additional 
information to emerge prior to issuance of the regulation; if this information indicates 
that the regulation will have unforeseen negative effects, then regulatory harm can be 
headed off. Second, it might reduce the effect of deliberative pathologies. If agencies 
polarize, or are trapped by polarized public views, then delay might help them avoid bad 
regulation.133 Third, it might limit the agenda-setting power of agencies by giving 
hierarchical superiors in the executive branch a chance to inform themselves of the 
effects of regulations.134 Fourth, it could reduce the incentive of interest groups to lobby 
for regulations by reducing their net present value. Whether these beneficial effects were 
an actual result of OMB review—either President Reagan’s original approach or 
Clinton’s modified version—remains an open empirical question. 
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CONCLUSION 
An obvious way to structure political institutions to generate desirable policy is to 
regulate the content of legislation. Familiar examples include judicially enforced 
constitutional restrictions on legislation that categorizes on the basis of race or sex or 
legislation that imposes mandates on states without providing federal funding. Just as 
important, but less discussed, is regulation, including self-regulation, of the procedures 
used to enact statutes. In this Article, we have emphasized a subset of this second group: 
timing rules. Regulating the timing of legislative action avoids the well-known 
difficulties with regulating content, namely, that judges are poorly positioned to second-
guess the policy judgments of legislators and to balance policy goals and constitutional 
values.  
Timing rules support democratic goals by facilitating monitoring of legislators by 
the public, of committee members by floor-members, and as a general matter of agents by 
principals. Timing rules can help filter out laws that are not public spirited without 
precluding laws on specific subjects (e.g. race distinctions) or by form (e.g. single-
subjects). Like other restrictions on legislation, however, timing rules are not costless, 
and can prevent legislatures from acting quickly when a crisis occurs or slowly when 
deliberation is necessary. They are also vulnerable to evasion, just as content-based 
restrictions are. The proper use of timing rules depends on context, and so one cannot at a 
high level of abstraction say whether the current system is optimal or not. Indeed, we 
have noted that Congress could use timing rules for bad ends, and this possibility must 
always be kept in mind. Timing rules then are no panacea. Like any tool, they can be 
used well or poorly. 
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